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Abstract. We give an analysis of various classical axioms and characterize a
notion of minimal classical logic that enforces Peirce’s law without enforcing Ex
Falso Quodlibet. We show that a “natural” implementation of this logic is Parigot’s
classical natural deduction. We then move on to the computational side and em-
phasize that Parigot’s λµ corresponds to minimal classical logic. A continuation
constant must be added to λµ to get full classical logic. The extended calculus is
isomorphic to a syntactical restriction of Felleisen’s theory of control that offers a
more expressive reduction semantics. This isomorphic calculus is in correspondence
with a refined version of Prawitz’s natural deduction.
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1. Introduction
Traditionally, classical logic is defined by extending intuitionistic logic
with either Peirce’s law, the excluded middle law, or the double nega-
tion law. We show that these laws are not equivalent and define minimal
classical logic, which validates Peirce’s law but not Ex Falso Quodlibet.
This logic is interesting from a computational point of view since it
corresponds to a calculus with a notion of control (such as callcc or µ)
which however does not permit aborting of computations. Indeed our
analysis reveals that closed typed terms of Parigot’s λµ (1992, 1993a)
correspond to tautologies of minimal classical logic and not of (full)
classical logic. To prove tautologies of classical natural deduction, the
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report (Ariola et al., 2005).
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λµ calculus must be extended with a continuation called tp which
denotes the top-level.
On the programming side, the presence of the continuation tp makes
it possible to distinguish between aborting a computation and throwing
to a continuation (as aborting corresponds to throwing to the spe-
cial top-level continuation). This distinction can be used to develop
more refined programming calculi for languages with control opera-
tors. In particular, in the seminal theory of control λC (Felleisen and
Hieb, 1992), there is a mismatch between the operational and proof-
theoretical interpretation of the reduction theory. This mismatch is
resolved by moving to a richer theory with a continuation constant.
We start in Section 2 with reviewing the definitions of minimal,
intuitionistic and classical logic. We present both the axiomatic and
structural rendering of these logics. We introduce an equivalent for-
mulation of Prawitz’s natural deduction which better corresponds to
the axiomatic presentation. We conclude the section with the more
recent formulation of Parigot’s classical natural deduction which em-
ploys sequents with multiple conclusions. In Section 3, we introduce
the new notion of minimal classical logic. We first analyze which ax-
ioms lead to this new logic. Next, we give the structural presentation.
Section 4 reviews the basic control operators and calculi together with
their (Curry-Howard) isomorphism to classical logic discovered by Grif-
fin (1990). Section 5 and 6 introduce two isomorphic calculi which
are the computational counterparts of classical natural deduction with
one and multiple conclusions, respectively. We discuss related work in
Section 7 and conclude in Section 8. Throughout the paper we restrict
our attention to propositional logic.
2. Minimal, Intuitionistic and Classical Logic
We successively recall the definitions of minimal, intuitionistic and clas-
sical logic, and state simple facts about them. We use natural deduction
to formalize the various logics.
2.1. Preliminaries
We assume a set of formulas, denoted by Roman uppercase letters
A, B, etc., which are built from an infinite set of propositional atoms
(ranged over by X,Y , etc.), a distinguished formula ⊥ denoting false,
and implication written→. A named formula is a pair of a formula and
a name taken from an infinite set of names. We write Ax, Bα, etc. for
named formulas. A context is a set of named formulas. We use Greek
uppercase letters Γ, ∆, etc. for contexts.
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A,B ::= X | ⊥ | A→ B
Γ ::= · | Γ, A
Γ, A `M A
Ax
Γ, A `M B
Γ `M A→ B
→i Γ `M A→ B Γ `M A
Γ `M B
→e
Figure 1. Minimal logic
If we are only interested in provability, contexts could have been
defined just as sets of formulas (not as sets of named formulas). But
in order to be able to assign λ-terms to proofs, we need to distin-
guish between different occurrences of the same formula. This is the
role of names. Otherwise, the two distinct normal proofs of A,A ` A
(representable by the λ-terms λx.λy.x and λx.λy.y) are identified.
We first consider sequents of the form Γ ` A, where the formulas
in Γ are the hypotheses and the formula on the right-hand side of the
symbol ` is the conclusion. If S is a schematic axiom or rule, we denote
by S,Γ ` A the fact that Γ ` A is derivable using an arbitrary number
of instances of S. We will sometimes omit irrelevant hypothesis to make
proofs more readable.
2.2. Minimal Logic
Minimal natural deduction is an implementation of minimal logic (Jo-
hansson, 1937). It is defined by the set of (schematic) inference rules
given in Figure 1 (the names of formulas are left implicit and omitted).
Minimal logic originally included negation but no formula ⊥. Nega-
tion in minimal logic is quite formal in the sense that A → ¬A → B
does not hold in general. It can actually be shown that ¬A in the
original minimal logic behaves exactly the same as A→ A0, where A0 is
some globally distinguished formula. We here transfer to minimal logic
the standard decomposition of ¬A as A→ ⊥ from intuitionistic or clas-
sical logic, hence taking A0 ∆= ⊥, but throwing away any specific rules
about ⊥. Thus, the formula ⊥, despite a name suggesting it denotes the
absurd formula, could essentially be interpreted by any formula, even
a true one. This in turn shows that minimal logic can alternatively be
seen as the positive fragment (i.e., the fragment without negation) of
intuitionistic logic.
Valuations and normal proofs are important tools for reasoning
about provability in propositional logic. When reasoning with valua-
tions requires proving completeness results we opt for reasoning with
normal proofs. We say that an occurrence of →e (also called Modus
Ponens) is normal if its left premise is an axiom or another normal
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A,B ::= X | ⊥ | A→ B
Γ ::= · | Γ, A
Γ, A `I A
Ax
Γ, A `I B
Γ `I A→ B
→i
Γ `I A→ B Γ `I A
Γ `I B
→e Γ `I ⊥
Γ `I A
⊥e
Figure 2. Intuitionistic logic
instance of Modus Ponens. We say that a proof in minimal logic is
normal if any occurrence of Modus Ponens in the proof is normal. It is
known that a provable statement can be proved with a normal proof.
THEOREM 1 (Prawitz). If Γ `M A is provable then there is a normal
proof of Γ `M A.
For all the systems we present, the following weakening lemma will
hold.
LEMMA 2. Let Γ ` A be derivable, then for every Γ′ such that Γ ⊆ Γ′,
Γ′ ` A is derivable.
2.3. Intuitionistic Logic
Any formula is implied by ⊥ in intuitionistic logic. A way to express this
in natural deduction is to consider ⊥ as a connective with no introduc-
tion rule and a single elimination rule as shown in Figure 2. Obviously,
this presentation of intuitionistic logic is equivalent to minimal logic
extended with the following schematic axiom:
⊥ → A Ex Falso Quodlibet sequitur (EFQ)
PROPOSITION 3. Γ `I A iff EFQ,Γ `M A.
In propositional or first-order predicate logic, there is no formula ⊥
with the desired property, as stated by the following lemma which ex-
presses that (propositional) intuitionistic logic is strictly stronger than
minimal logic.
PROPOSITION 4. 6`M EFQ.
final-for-pdf.tex; 15/05/2012; 4:49; p.4
A Proof-Theoretic Foundation of Abortive Continuations 5
Proof. Follows from the soundness of minimal logic with respect to
classical valuations V by taking V(⊥) = 1 (van Dalen, 1997).
Note that the proof more generally shows that there is no possi-
ble interpretation of ⊥ in minimal logic that makes EFQ provable. In
contrast, in minimal second-order logic, a formula having the property
of ⊥ is ∀X.X. The result actually also extends to classical logic (as
soon as ⊥ is not inter ...
Remark 1. Negation can be defined directly with the following infer-
ence rules with no reference to ⊥:
Γ, A ` B Γ, A ` ¬B
Γ ` ¬A ¬i
Γ ` A Γ ` ¬A
Γ ` B ¬e
The rule ¬i is derivable in minimal logic whereas ¬e uses ⊥e. In the
following we also use the abbreviation:
¬BA ∆= A→ B (Abbrev. 1)
Assuming the set of formulas is enriched with disjunction and the
following inference rules:
Γ ` A1
Γ ` A1 ∨A2
Γ ` A2
Γ ` A1 ∨A2
Γ ` A1 ∨A2 Γ, A1 ` C Γ, A2 ` C
Γ ` C
the formula (¬A∨B)→ (A→ B) is provable in intuitionistic logic but
not in minimal logic. The converse is only provable in weak classical
logic, which is given next. Normalization still holds with the addition
of disjunction.
2.4. Axiomatic Presentation of Classical Logic
Traditionally classical logic is obtained by adding any of the schematic
axioms given in Figure 3 to intuitionistic logic (Lalement, 1993). To
acquire a better understanding of the strength of these classical axioms
we analyze them in minimal logic, and further classify them in three
categories: we call PL⊥ and EM weak classical axioms, PL and GEM
minimal classical axioms, and DN a (full) classical axiom. We remark
that none of the classical axioms are derivable in minimal logic and that
the weak classical axioms are weaker than the minimal classical axioms
which themselves are weaker than DN. Together with EFQ, weak and
minimal classical axioms are however equivalent to DN.
PROPOSITION 5. In minimal logic, we have:
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Weak classical:
(¬A→ A)→ A Weak Peirce’s law (PL⊥)
¬A ∨A Excluded middle (EM)
Minimal Classical :
((A→ B)→ A)→ A Peirce’s law (PL)
(A→ B) ∨A Generalized excluded-middle (GEM)
Classical :
¬¬A→ A Double negation law (DN)
Figure 3. Classical schematic axioms
1. None of PL⊥, PL, EM, GEM, and DN are derivable.
2. PL⊥ and EM are equivalent (as schemes).
3. GEM and PL are equivalent (as schemes).
4. GEM and PL imply EM and PL⊥ but not conversely.
5. DN implies GEM and PL but not conversely.
6. DN, EM+EFQ, PL⊥+EFQ, GEM+EFQ, and PL+EFQ are all
equivalent.
Proof. We only show the proofs of 5 and 6.
5. We first show that DN implies EFQ:
DN
¬A,⊥ `M ⊥ Ax
⊥ `M ¬¬A
→i
⊥ `M A
→e
`M ⊥ → A
→i
DN implies PL (we make use of DN and EFQ as rules intead of
axioms):
¬A `M ¬A Ax
¬BA→ A `M ¬BA→ A Ax
¬A `M ¬A Ax A `M A Ax
A,¬A `M ⊥
→e
A,¬A `M B EFQ
¬A `M ¬BA
→i
¬BA→ A,¬A `M A
→e
¬BA→ A,¬A `M ⊥
→e
¬BA→ A `M ¬¬A
→i
¬BA→ A `M A DN
`M (¬BA→ A)→ A
→i
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A,B ::= X | ⊥ | A→ B
Γ ::= · | Γ, A | Γ, A→⊥
Γ, A `RAA A
Ax
Γ, A `RAA B
Γ `RAA A→ B
→i Γ `RAA A→ B Γ `RAA A
Γ `RAA B
→e
Γ, A→⊥`RAA⊥
Γ `RAA A
RAA⊥
Γ, A→⊥`RAA A
Γ, A→⊥`RAA⊥
⊥ i Γ `RAA ⊥
Γ `RAA⊥
⊥e
Figure 4. Classical natural deduction with one conclusion
As in Proposition 4, the converse direction follows from the sound-
ness of minimal logic.
6. PL⊥ and EFQ imply DN:
PL⊥
EFQ
¬¬A `M ¬¬A Ax ¬A `M ¬A Ax
¬¬A,¬A `M ⊥
→e
¬¬A,¬A `M A
→e
¬¬A `M ¬A→ A
→i
¬¬A `M A
→e
`M ¬¬A→ A
→i
2.5. Structural Presentation of Classical Logic
We present two implementations of classical logic: we start with an
alternative of Prawitz’s classical logic (1965) and then present Parigot’s
Classical Natural Deduction (1992).
2.5.1. Revised Prawitz’s Classical Logic
Prawitz (1965) defines classical logic as minimal logic plus the Reductio
Ad Absurdum rule:
Γ,¬A ` ⊥
Γ ` A
RAA
This rule implies EFQ as DN implies EFQ. Also PL⊥ plus EFQ are
equivalent to RAA. In here we develop a revision of Prawitz’s classical
logic which comes from analyzing the following proof of PL, where
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Γ, Γ1 and Γ2 stand for {A,¬A,¬BA → A}, {¬A,¬BA → A}, and
{¬BA→ A} respectively:
PL⊥
Γ1 `M ¬BA→ A Ax
EFQ
Γ `M ¬A Ax Γ `M A Ax
Γ `M ⊥
→e
Γ `M B
→e
Γ1 `M A→ B
→i
Γ1 `M A
→e
Γ2 `M ¬A→ A
→i
Γ2 `M A
→e
`M (¬BA→ A)→ A
→i
The proof uses EFQ. However, this seems counter-intuitive since PL
is weaker than DN, and therefore the proof should not need the full
power of EFQ. We address this discrepancy by providing a restricted
version of EFQ that can be used to prove PL from PL⊥ but not DN.
This is done by defining a new ⊥e rule as follows:
Γ ` ⊥
Γ `⊥ ⊥e
and by introducing the Weakening rule defined as follows:
Γ `⊥
Γ ` A Weakening
The new symbol ⊥ stands for a sequent with no conclusions, that is,
instead of writing Γ ` we write Γ `⊥ . As we explain in Section 5, the
symbol ⊥ has an interesting computational justification. In Figure 4
we present Prawitz’s revision. Formulae do not contain ⊥ , thus for
example the sequent Γ ` A →⊥ is not syntactically correct. However,
⊥ can occur in the context Γ in the form of A→⊥ . Other than the ⊥e
rule, ⊥ is introduced by the ⊥ i rule. This rule is not subsumed by the
implication elimination, as suggested below:
Γ, A→⊥` A→⊥ Ax Γ, A→⊥` A
Γ, A→⊥`⊥ →e
A→⊥ is not a formula, hence the left-hand side sequent in the premise
is not a correct instance of the axiom.
The addition of ⊥e and Weakening to minimal logic gives intuition-
istic logic. To obtain classical logic, a variant of RAA, called RAA⊥ ,
must be added.
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Remark 2. The addition of RAA⊥ eliminates the need for Weakening
which becomes an admissible rule. If Γ `⊥ is derivable then the sequent
Γ, A →⊥`⊥ is derivable by Lemma 2. By RAA⊥ one then obtains
Γ ` A. We may later use the admissible Weakening rule to simplify the
presentation.
EXAMPLE 6. We formulate the proofs of PL and DN in the logic of
Figure 4. Only the proof of DN uses the ⊥e rule. The use of EFQ in
the proof of PL is replaced by an application of the Weakening rule.
1.
¬BA→ A `RAA ¬BA→ A Ax
¬⊥A,A `RAA A Ax
¬⊥A,A `RAA⊥ ⊥ i
¬⊥A,A `RAA B Weakening
¬⊥A `RAA ¬BA
→i
¬⊥A,¬BA→ A `RAA A
→e
¬BA→ A,¬⊥A `RAA⊥ ⊥ i
¬BA→ A `RAA A RAA⊥
`RAA (¬BA→ A)→ A
→i
2.
¬¬A `RAA ¬¬A Ax
A→⊥ , A `RAA A Ax
A→⊥ , A `RAA⊥ ⊥ i
A→⊥ , A `RAA ⊥ Weakening
A→⊥`RAA ¬A
→i
A→⊥ ,¬¬A `RAA ⊥
→e
A→⊥ ,¬¬A `RAA⊥ ⊥e
¬¬A `RAA A RAA⊥
`RAA ¬¬A→ A
→i
PROPOSITION 7. Γ `RAA A iff Γ′,PL `I A, where Γ′ is obtained from
Γ by replacing each B →⊥ by a subcontext ∆ of the form
B → C1, · · · , B → Cn .
Proof.
⇐ Follows from the following two points: 1) PL is provable in classical
logic; 2) each axiom of the form
B → C1, · · · , B → Cn `I B → Ci
can be replaced by
B →⊥ , B `RAA B Ax
B →⊥ , B `RAA⊥ ⊥ i
B →⊥ , B `RAA Ci Weakening
B →⊥`RAA B → Ci
→i
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⇒ By rule induction. The only interesting case is rule RAA⊥ . We
distinguish two cases depending on which rule introduced ⊥ .
⊥e) We have:
ΓA→⊥`RAA ⊥
ΓA→⊥`RAA⊥ ⊥e
Γ `RAA A RAA⊥
By the induction hypothesis:
Γ′, A→ B1, · · · , A→ Bn, PL `I ⊥ .
The result then follows from ⊥e and n applications of PLr:
Γ′, A→ B1, · · · , A→ Bn, PL `I ⊥
Γ′, A→ B1, · · ·A→ Bn, PL `I A ⊥e
Γ′, PL `I A PL
n
r
where PLr stands for the derived inference rule
Γ, PL `I ((A→ B)→ A)→ A
Γ, PL,A→ B `I A
Γ, PL `I (A→ B)→ A
Γ, PL `I A
⊥ i) We further distinguish two cases. Suppose:
Γ, A→⊥`RAA A
Γ, A→⊥`RAA⊥ ⊥ i
Γ `RAA A RAA⊥
By the induction hypothesis:
Γ′, A→ B1, · · · , A→ Bn, PL `I A
The result then follows by n applications of PLr. For the
other case, we have:
Γ, A→⊥ , B →⊥`RAA B
Γ, A→⊥ , B →⊥`RAA⊥ ⊥ i
Γ, B →⊥`RAA A RAA⊥
By the induction hypothesis:
Γ′,∆1,∆2, PL `I B
where ∆1 and ∆2 are as follows:
∆1 = {A→ C1, · · · , A→ Cn}
∆2 = {B → D1, · · · , B → Dm}
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A,B ::= X | ⊥ | A→ B
Γ,∆ ::= · | Γ, A
Γ, A `C A; ∆
Ax
Γ `C ⊥; ∆
Γ `C; ∆
⊥e
Γ, A `C B; ∆
Γ `C A→ B; ∆
→i
Γ `C A→ B; ∆ Γ `C A; ∆
Γ `C B; ∆
→e
Γ `C A;A,∆
Γ `C;A,∆
Passivate
Γ `C;A,∆
Γ `C A; ∆
Activate
Figure 5. Classical natural deduction with multiple conclusions
We proceed as follows:
B → A `I B → A Ax Γ′,∆1,∆2, PL `I B
Γ′,∆1,∆2, B → A,PL `I A
→e
Γ′,∆2, B → A,PL `I A PL
n
r
2.5.2. Parigot’s Natural Deduction with Multiple Conclusions
As initially shown by Gentzen (1969) in his sequent calculus LK, clas-
sical logic can be obtained by considering sequents with several con-
clusions instead of adding new inference rules. Parigot (1992) extended
this approach to natural deduction. We show that using sequents with
several conclusions allows for a uniform presentation of different logics.
Parigot’s convention is to have two kinds of sequents, one with only
named formulas on the right:
Γ ` ∆ ,
and one with exactly one unnamed formula on the right:
Γ ` A,∆ .
To clearly mark the distinction between an unnamed formula and the
set ∆ of named formulas, we write the above sequents as:
Γ `; ∆ and Γ ` A; ∆ .
Girard (1991) calls the optional formula a stoup. The formulas in Γ are
the hypotheses and the formulas on the right-hand side of the symbol `
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are the conclusions. In each case, the intuitive meaning is that the
conjunction of the hypotheses implies the disjunction of the conclusions.
A sequent with no conclusion means the negation of the conjunction of
the hypotheses.
The inference rules are shown in Figure 5. The formulas explicitly
mentioned in the inference rules are called active. The one bearing the
connective (introduced or eliminated) is called the main formula. The
notation A,∆ stands for the union of the singleton context A and ∆
and assumes that both components are disjoint. All rules, except the
Passivate rule and the ⊥e rule, have an active formula in the conclusion.
The axiom and implication rules are as in minimal logic. The goal of
the Activate and Passivate rules is to allow changing focus from the main
formula to any other formula in the context. For example, the sequent:
A `C A;B,A Ax
indicates that our focus is on formula A. To focus on formula B, ap-
pearing in the right-hand side context, we first need to unfocus A (using
the Passivate rule):
A `C A;B,A
A `C;B,A Passivate
thus obtaining a sequent with no active formula. To focus on B we use
the Activate rule:
A `C;B,A
A `C B;A Activate
These steps are necessary to show `C A→ B;A, since in order to apply
the implication introduction rule the formula B has to be active:
A `C A;B,A Ax
A `C;B,A Passivate
A `C B;A Activate
`C A→ B;A
→i
EXAMPLE 8. We prove PL and DN in the logic of Figure 5.
1.
(A→ B)→ A `C (A→ B)→ A;A Ax
A `C A;A,B Ax
A `C B;A Pass./Act.
`C A→ B;A
→i
(A→ B)→ A `C A;A
→e
(A→ B)→ A `C A; Pass./Act.
`C ((A→ B)→ A)→ A;
→i
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2.
¬¬A `C ¬¬A;A Ax
¬¬A,A `C A;⊥, A Ax
¬¬A,A `C ⊥;A Pass./Act.
¬¬A `C ¬A;A
→i
¬¬A `C ⊥;A
→e
¬¬A `C A; ⊥e/Activate
`C ¬¬A→ A;
→i
The above proof uses the rule ⊥e whereas the proof of PL does not.
Parigot’s classical logic is a correct characterization of classical logic,
as expressed in the following proposition. If the context ∆ is the set of
formulas A1, · · · , An, then we write ¬⊥∆ for the set ¬⊥A1, · · · ,¬⊥An,
where ¬⊥A stands for A→⊥ .
PROPOSITION 9.
− Γ `C A; ∆ iff Γ,¬⊥∆ `RAA A.
− Γ `C A; iff PL,Γ `I A
3. Minimal Classical Logic
The previous section suggests that there is space for a classical logic
which does validate Peirce’s law (or GEM) but not EFQ. By analogy
with minimal intuitionistic logic, we call this logic minimal classical
logic. As discussed in the case of minimal intuitionistic logic, minimal
classical logic can be seen as the positive fragment of classical logic
where the absurdity formula and negation are still there but in a de-
generated form that does not allow one to prove any formula from
an absurdity. More specifically, Avron (1991) notes that a standard
axiomatization of classical positive logic is provided by the following
axioms:
A→ (B → A)
(A→ (B → C))→ ((A→ B)→ (A→ C))
((A→ B)→ A)→ A
plus the Modus Ponens inference rule. Indeed, this axiomatization is
equivalent to minimal logic plus Pierce Law (Goubault-Larrecq and
Mackie, 2001).
Since ⊥ in minimal classical logic is a distinguished formula without
any special properties, EM and PL⊥, without EFQ, are weaker than
PL and their addition to minimal logic seems uninteresting.
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The minimal subset of the revised version of Prawitz’s classical logic
(see Figure 4) is obtained by disallowing the ⊥e rule and is denoted by
`MRAA.
PROPOSITION 10. Γ `MRAA A iff Γ,PL `M A.
Another implementation of minimal classical logic is Parigot’s clas-
sical natural deduction (see Figure 5) with no special rule for ⊥. That
is, without hiding the occurrences of the ⊥ formula on the right-hand-
side of the sequents (Parigot, 1992, p. 198). We denote this subset by
`MC.
PROPOSITION 11.
− Γ `MC A; ∆ iff Γ,¬⊥∆ `MRAA A.
− Γ `MC A iff PL,Γ `M A
Using Proposition 5(5), we have the following corollary.
COROLLARY 12. Minimal Parigot’s classical natural deduction does
not prove DN.
However the sequent `MC ¬¬A→ A;⊥ is provable.
We now define the notion of normal proof for a minimal variant of
Parigot’s classical natural deduction. We say that an occurrence of the
rule Passivate is normal if its premise is not an Activate rule. We say
that a proof in minimal classical natural deduction is normal if any
occurrence of Modus Ponens in the proof is normal (this is the same
definition as for minimal non-classical natural deduction) and if any
occurrence of Passivate is also normal.
THEOREM 13 (Parigot (1993a)). If Γ `MC A; ∆ is provable then there
is a normal proof of Γ `MC A; ∆
We define normal proofs for classical natural deduction as for min-
imal classical natural deduction where the rule ⊥e is normal if its
premise is not an Activate rule (i.e. ⊥e is considered at the same level as
Passivate). Parigot’s normalization proof for minimal classical natural
deduction (Parigot, 1993b; Parigot, 1997) applies also for full classical
natural deduction.
THEOREM 14 (Parigot). If Γ `C A; ∆ is provable then there is a
normal proof of Γ `C A; ∆.
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As expected, full classical logic is conservative over minimal classical
logic for formulas not mentioning the ⊥ formula, as stated by the
following consequence of Theorem 14.
PROPOSITION 15. If ⊥ does not occur in A then `C A iff `MC A.
Proof. The “if” part is trivial. For the “only if” part, let’s apply
Theorem 14 to get a normal form of `C A and consider the more general
case of a proof of Γ `MC Ξ; ∆, where Ξ stands for an optional formula
and ⊥ does not occur in Γ.
We show by induction that the rule ⊥e cannot occur in the proof.
First, we observe that the only rule changing the context to the left of `,
namely →i, preserves the property that ⊥ does not occur in Γ. Next,
we show that it is impossible that the rule ⊥e occurs in the derivation.
Assume that it were so, deriving Γ `C; ∆ from a proof pi of Γ `C ⊥; ∆.
Since pi is normal, it does not start with an Activate rule so that it starts
either by an axiom rule or by a sequence of→e whose leftmost premise
(by normality of pi) is an axiom rule. This means that there should be
an hypothesis of the form A1 → ... → An → ⊥ in Γ which contradicts
the fact that ⊥ does not occur in the formulas of Γ.
Remark 3. Without the rule Passivate minimal classical natural de-
duction yields minimal logic, since the context ∆ is inert and can only
remain empty in a derivation for which the end sequent has the form
Γ ` A; (even the Activate rule cannot be applied). Similarly, classical
natural deduction without the Passivate rule yields intuitionistic logic.
As a consequence, minimal and intuitionistic natural deduction can
both be seen as subsystems of classical natural deduction.
4. Control Operators and Calculi
The logical systems introduced so far can be related to programming
under the so called Curry-Howard isomorphism. The isomorphism es-
tablishes a correspondence between a proof of a formula A and a
program of type A. Executing a program corresponds to normalizing a
proof.
Minimal logic corresponds to the simply-typed λ-calculus (Baren-
dregt, 1992). As shown in Figure 6, the axiom of minimal logic corre-
sponds to looking up an environment for a variable’s typing, lambda
abstraction corresponds to implication introduction, and function ap-
plication corresponds to implication elimination. Execution is carried
out by the β-rule:
(λx.N1)N2 → N1[N2/x]
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M ::= x | λx.M |MM
Γ ::= · | Γ, x : A
Γ, x : A ` x : A Ax
Γ, x : A `M : B
Γ ` λx.M : A→ B →i
Γ `M : A→ B Γ `M ′ : A
Γ `MM ′ : B →e
Figure 6. The λ-calculus and minimal logic
M ::= x | λx.M |MN | A M | K M | C M
V ::= x | λx.M
E ::= 2 | E M | V E
Figure 7. Syntax of λC
where N1[N2/x] stands for the capture-free substitution of N2 for each
free occurrence of x in N1. A β-redex corresponds to a non normal
occurrence of Modus Ponens and β-reduction eliminates these detours.
Griffin (1990) was the first to extend the Curry-Howard isomorphism
to classical logic. This entails extending the λ-calculus with control
operators, which are reviewed next.
4.1. Control operators and their semantics
To reason about Scheme programs, Felleisen and Hieb (1992) intro-
duced the λC-calculus whose syntax is in Figure 7. The calculus extends
the call-by-value λ-calculus with the operators abort (A), callcc (K),
and C. The operators K and C provide abortive continuations: the invo-
cation of a continuation reinstates the captured context in place of the
current one. Their semantics can be described most concisely using the
following three operational rules, which rewrite complete programs:
E[A M ] 7→ M
E[K M ] 7→ E[M (λx. A E[x])]
E[C M ] 7→ M (λx. A E[x])
In each of the rules, the entire program is split into an evaluation
context E representing the continuation, and a current redex to rewrite.
The operator A aborts the continuation returning its subexpression to
the top-level; the other two operators capture the evaluation context E
and reify it as a function (λx.A E[x]). When invoked, this function
aborts the evaluation context at the point of invocation, and installs
the captured context instead.
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M ::= x | λx.M |MM | C M
V ::= x | λx.M
λnC

β : (λx.M) N → M [N/x]
CL : (C M) N → C (λk.M (λf.A (k (fN))))
Ctp : C M → C (λk.M (λf.A (k f)))
Cidem : C (λk.C M) → C (λk.M (λx.A (x)))
Celim : C (λk.k M) → M k 6∈ FV (M)
λvC

β : (λx.M) V → M [V/x]
CL : (C M) N → C (λk.M (λf.A (k (fN))))
CR : V (C M) → C (λk.M (λx.A (k (V x))))
Ctp : C M → C (λk.M (λf.A (k f)))
Cidem : C (λk.C M) → C (λk.M (λx.A (x)))
Figure 8. Call-by-name and call-by-value λC reduction rules
The rules show that C differs from K in that C does not duplicate
the evaluation context:
C (λk.4) + 1 7→ (λk.4)(λz.A (z + 1)) 7→ 4
K (λk.4) + 1 7→ ((λk.4)(λz.A (z + 1))) + 1 7→ 5
This difference makes C at least as expressive as both A and K; it can
be used to define them as follows:
A M ∆= C (λ . M) (Abbrev. 2)
K M ∆= C (λc. c (M c)) (Abbrev. 3)
where refers to an anonymous variable. The operator K is not as
powerful as C (Felleisen, 1990); expressing C using K is only possible if
we also have the abort primitive A:
C (M) ∆= K (λk. A (M k))
In the sequel we focus on C, but still occasionally treat A as a primitive
control operator to provide more intuition.
4.2. Reduction Rules
Instead of presenting the semantics of control operators as a relation on
complete programs, it is possible to give local reduction rules that are
applicable anywhere in a term and in arbitrary order. The call-by-value
and call-by-name reduction semantics of λC are presented in Figure 8.
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It is possible to consider more rules, e.g. η, but they are not needed
for expressing evaluation. The rules simulate the capture of the eval-
uation context using several small steps: first the control operation
is lifted across one context at a time until it reaches another control
operator. At any point, it is possible to use Ctp to start applying M to
part of the captured context and then continue lifting the outer C to
accumulate more of the context. The reduction rules are however not
expressive enough to compute a value, which is obtainable by applying
the computation rule (i.e. only applicable at the top-level):
C M 7→M (λx.A (x)).
However, the reduction rules are powerful enough to delay the applica-
tion of this rule until the end.
Remark 4. An important point to clarify is the presence of the abort
operations in the right-hand sides of the reduction rules. As far as
evaluation is concerned, they are not necessary. They are important in
order to obtain a satisfying correspondence between the operational and
reduction semantics. For example, the term 3 +C (λk.2 +k1) evaluates
to 4 according to λvC. By reducing the same term with the reduction
rules without the abort operations we have:
3 + C (λk. 2 + k 1) →CR C (λq. (λk. 2 + k 1)(λx. q (3 + x)))
→ C (λq. 2 + q 4)
The absence of the abort makes it impossible to eliminate the control
context 2 + 2, at least without using some context-sensitive infor-
mation about the binding of q. With the presence of the abort, the
term includes specific information that q is not a normal function but
is an abortive continuation which never returns to its caller. As we
explain in Section 5, these abort steps are different from the abort
used in defining C in terms of K. The aborts in the reduction rules
correspond to throwing to a user defined continuation (i.e. a Passivate
step), whereas the abort in the definition of C corresponds to throwing
to the predefined top-level continuation (i.e. a ⊥e step).
4.3. Griffin’s Type System
Griffin noticed that the evaluation rule of C suggests the following type:
Γ `M : (A→ B)→ B
Γ ` C (M) : A
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M ::= x | λx.M |MM | KB M
V ::= x | λx.M
E ::= 2 | E M | V E
P ::= 2 | PM |MP | λx.P | KB P
λnKB :
β : (λx.M) N → M [N/x]
KBL : (KB M) N → KB (λk.M (λf.k (fN)) N)
KBtp : KB (λk.P [E[k M ]]) → KB (λk.P [k M ])
KBelim : KB (λk.k M) → M k 6∈ FV (M)
λvKB :
β : (λx.M) V → M [V/x]
KBL : (KB M) N → KB (λk.M (λf.k (fN)) N)
KBR : V (KB M) → KB (λk.V (M (λx.k (V x))))
KBtp : KB (λk.P [E[k M ]]) → KB (λk.P [k M ])
Figure 9. Call-by-name and call-by-value λnKB reduction rules
which would lead to the following typing of A:
Γ `M : B
Γ ` A (M) : A
By reading types as propositions, the above rule would lead to an in-
consistent system, since every formula would be provable. To solve the
problem Griffin introduced a new type ⊥ representing the proposition
false, and set B to ⊥:
Γ `M : (A→ ⊥)→ ⊥
Γ ` C (M) : A
Γ `M : ⊥
Γ ` A (M) : A
In conclusion, with the addition of control operators we have a term
assignment for intuitionistic and classical logic. We let λA denote the
λ-calculus extended with the constant A of type ⊥ → A.
PROPOSITION 16. A formula A is provable in classical logic (resp.
intuitionistic logic) iff there exists a closed λC term (resp. λA term) M
such that `M : A is provable.
Defining K in terms of C (as in Abbrev. 3) produces the following
typing for K:
K : (¬A→ A)→ A
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To witness Peirce’s law we need an alternative operator which we call
KB defined as follows:
KB M ∆= C (λc. c (M (λx. A (c x)))) (Abbrev. 4)
For example we write KB(λc. 1 + c 1), instead of K (λc. 1 +A (c 1)).
The reduction rules for KB are given in Figure 9. It would seem natural
to also include a rule similar to Cidem such as:
KB(λk. KBM)→ KB(λk. M k)
However, the above breaks subject reduction as the following example
illustrates:
KB (λk. KB(λq. if q 1 then 7 else k 99)) →
KB (λk. if k 1 then 7 else k 99))
If we let λKB be the λ-calculus extended with the constant KB with
type PL we arrive at the following result.
PROPOSITION 17. A formula A is provable in minimal classical logic
iff there exists a closed λKB term M such that `M : A is provable.
Remark 5. Parigot (1992) criticized Griffin’s work because the pro-
posed C-typing did not fit the operational semantics. Setting the type
of a continuation to be ¬A implies that the top-level has type ⊥, but
there is no closed term of type ⊥, since ⊥ corresponds to the empty
type. Therefore, the typing is useless. Said otherwise, with the current
typing for C we lose subject reduction. For example, in the following
reduction:
C (λq. q 5) + 2 7→ (λq. q 5)(λx. A (x+ 2)) ,
the left-hand side has type int, whereas the right-hand side does not
type check: the abort is invoked with an int type instead of a ⊥ type. To
solve this conflict between ⊥ and the top-level type, Griffin proposed
to consider programs of the shape C(λk.k M), thus creating a term
of type ⊥. As detailed in the next section, the classical version of
Parigot’s λµ requires a similar intervention; a free continuation constant
is needed. It is also important to underline that Griffin’s typing is pre-
served by the reduction semantics of Figure 8, as was also emphasized
by de Groote (1994). The only rule that breaks subject reduction is the
top-level computation rule (i.e. C M 7→M (λx.A (x))), which forces a
conversion from ⊥ to the top-level type.
4.4. Curry-Howard Isomorphism
Summarizing the previous results we have:
final-for-pdf.tex; 15/05/2012; 4:49; p.20
A Proof-Theoretic Foundation of Abortive Continuations 21
− λ-calculus + A corresponds to minimal logic + EFQ;
− λ-calculus + C corresponds to minimal logic + DN;
− λ-calculus + K corresponds to minimal logic + PL⊥;
− λ-calculus + KB corresponds to minimal logic + PL.
INTERMEZZO 18. The encodings presented above can be derived by
assigning terms to proofs.
1. For example, the encoding of A in terms of C (see Abbrev. 2) is
derived by assigning a term to the proof of ⊥ → A in terms of
elimination of double negation:
` C : DN
k : ¬A, y : ⊥ ` y : ⊥
y : ⊥ ` λk.y : ¬¬A →i
y : ⊥ ` C(λk.y) : A →e
` λy.C(λk.y) : ⊥ → A →i
2. We derive the encoding of K in terms of C by assigning a term to
the proof of PL⊥ in terms of DN(we simply write C instead of the
axiom ` C : DN):
C
k : ¬A ` k : ¬A
y : ¬A→ A ` y : ¬A→ A k : ¬A ` k : ¬A
y : ¬A→ A, k : ¬A ` yk : A →e
y : ¬A→ A, k : ¬A ` k(yk) : ⊥ →e
y : ¬A→ A ` λk.k(yk) : ¬¬A →i
y : ¬A→ A ` C(λk.k(yk) : A →e
` λy.C(λk.k(yk)) : (¬A→ A)→ A →i
3. We derive the encoding of C in terms of K by assigning a term to
the proof of DN in terms of PL⊥ and EFQ:
` K : PL⊥
` A : EFQ
z : ¬¬A ` z : ¬¬A x : ¬A ` x : ¬A
z : ¬¬A, x : ¬A ` z x : ⊥ →e
z : ¬¬A, x : ¬A ` A (z x) : A →e
z : ¬¬A ` λx.A (z x) : ¬A→ A →i
z : ¬¬A ` K(λx.A (z x)) : A →e
` λz.K(λx.A (z x)) : ¬¬A→ A →i
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4. We derive the definition of KB in terms of K⊥ by assigning a term
to the proof of PL in terms of PL⊥, where we let Γ = {y : ¬BA→
A} and Γ1 = {x : A, z : ¬A}. To avoid clutter in the proof, instead
of the axioms ` A : EFQ and ` K : PL⊥, we simply write A and K.
K
Γ ` y : ¬BA→ A Ax
A
z : ¬A ` z : ¬A Ax x : A ` x : A Ax
Γ1 ` z x : ⊥
→e
Γ1 ` A (z x) : B
→e
z : ¬A ` λx.A (z x) : A→ B →i
Γ, z : ¬A ` y λx.A (z x) : A →e
Γ ` λz.(y λx.A (z x)) : ¬A→ A →i
Γ ` K(λz.(y λx.A (z x))) : A →e
` λy.K(λz.(y λx.A (z x))) : (¬BA→ A)→ A
→i
We can write the above term in ML as follows:
- fun PL y = callcc (fn z => (y (fn x => throw z x)))
val PL = fn : ((’a -> ’b) -> ’a) -> ’a
If we compare the ML term and the PL proof assignment, we notice
that one term contains an abort invocation whereas the other one
contains a throw construct. This disparity was already pointed out
before when we stressed that the proof of Peirce’s law should not
invoke EFQ or equivalently an abort statement. That disparity led
to the introduction of an alternative of Prawitz’s logic which still
needs a term assignment. We turn to its definition in the next
section, which justifies the distinction between ⊥ and ⊥ .
5. Computational Content of Classical Deduction
with One Conclusion
We introduce a refinement of λC called the λC-tp-calculus which is better-
behaved as a reduction system than λC. The set of λC terms extends
the λ-calculus terms with terms of the form C-(λk. J) where J stands
for a jump, that is, a term of the form k M or tp M . The meta-
variable k ranges over continuation variables, which are distinct from
regular variables. The continuation tp is a special constant which de-
notes the top-level. The translation from λC to λC-tp is given in Figure 11.
In the new calculus, it is possible to distinguish between capturing a
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M ::= x |MM | λx.M | C-(λk. J)
J ::= k M | tp M
Γ ::= · | Γ, x : A | Γ, k : ¬⊥A
Γ, x : A ` x : A Ax
Γ `M : ⊥
Γ ` tp M :⊥ ⊥e
Γ `M :A→ B Γ `M ′ :A
Γ `MM ′ : B →e
Γ, x : A `M : B
Γ ` λx.M :A→ B →i
Γ, k : ¬⊥A `M : A
Γ, k : ¬⊥A ` k M :⊥ ⊥ i
Γ, k : ¬⊥A ` J :⊥
Γ ` C-(λk. J) : A RAA⊥
Figure 10. λC-tp and classical logic with one conclusion
(x)◦ = x
(λx.M)◦ = λx.M◦
(MN)◦ = M◦ N◦
(C M)◦ = C-(λk.tp (M◦(λx.throw k x)))
(K M)◦ = C-(λk.k (M◦(λx.throw k x)))
Figure 11. Embedding of λC into λC-tp
continuation and expressing where to go next. The embedding of C
explicitly expresses the jump to the top-level, and the embedding of K
explicitly expresses that control goes back to the current context. These
things are left implicit in λC.
To summarize, aborting a computation (i.e. , throwing to the top-
level continuation) is written as:
A- M ∆= C-(λ . tp M) (Abbrev. 5)
and throwing to a user-defined continuation is written as:
throw k M ∆= C-(λ . k M) (Abbrev. 6)
5.1. Type System
We adopt two types of judgments: Γ `M : A and Γ ` J :⊥ . Since the
invocation of a continuation leaves the current context, it intuitively
corresponds to a sequent with no conclusion. Instead of typing a con-
tinuation as A → ⊥ we use the type A →⊥ , thus distinguishing the
top-level type from the result type of a continuation. However, we still
need a conversion from ⊥ to any other type in order to write terms
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such as 1+k 1 where k is a continuation. This conversion is done by the
Weakening rule. The invocation of a continuation simply corresponds to
a ⊥ introduction. If the argument has type ⊥, which is the top-level
type, the special continuation denoting the top-level is called. We have:
` λy.C-(λk. tp (y (λx.throw k x))) : ¬¬A→ A
` λy. C-(λk.k (y (λx.throw k x))) : (¬BA→ A)→ A
As expected, only the term witnessing DN refers to the top-level con-
tinuation. We call λC- the subset of λC-tp which does not allow terms of
the form C-(λk.tp M).
PROPOSITION 19. A formula A is provable in minimal classical logic
(resp. classical logic) with one conclusion iff there exists a closed λC-
term (resp. λC-tp term) M such that `M : A is provable.
By Propositions 10, 17 and 19, λC- is equivalent to λKB . However,
it might not be at all obvious how in λKB to use a continuation in
different contexts, since we do not have weakening available. Consider
for example the following λC- term:
C-(λk. k (if throw k 1 then 7 else throw k 99))
We use the continuation in both boolean and integer contexts. How
can we write the above expression without making use of weakening or
throw? The proof of Proposition 7 gives the answer:
KB (λk. KB (λq. if q 1 then 7 else k 99))
We call λA- the subset of λC- which only allows jumps to the top-
level, that is, it corresponds to the λ-calculus extended with terms of
the form C-(λ .tp M).
PROPOSITION 20. A formula A is provable in intuitionistic logic iff
there exists a closed λA- term M such that `M : A is provable.
5.2. Reduction Semantics
The call-by-name and call-by-value λC-tp reduction rules are given in
Figure 12. The rule Ctop, whose action is to wrap an application of a
continuation with a throw operation, is not needed. The rule C-idem’ is
a special case of Cidem where the continuation k′ is tp. The rule C-idem is
similar to the rule proposed by Barbanera and Berardi (1993):
M (C N)→ N (λa. (M a)) ,
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V ::= x | λx.M
λnC- and λnC-tp
β : (λx. M) N → M [N/x]
C-L : (C- λk. J) N → C-(λk. J [k (PN)/k P ])
C-idem : C-(λk. k′ (C- (λq.J)) → C-(λk. J [k′/q])
C-idem’ : C-(λk. tp (C- (λq.J)) → C-(λk. J [tp/q])
C-elim : C-(λk. k M) → M k 6∈ FV (M)
λvC- and λvC-tp
β : (λx.M)V → M [V/x]
C-elim : C-(λk. k M) → M k 6∈ FV (M)
C-L : (C-(λk. J)) N → C-(λk. J [k (PN)/k P ])
C-R : V (C-(λk. J)) → C-(λk. J [k (V P )/k P ])
C-idem : C-(λk. k′ (C- (λq. J))) → C-(λk. J [k′/q])
C-idem’ : C-(λk. tp (C- (λq. J))) → C-(λk. J [tp/q])
Figure 12. Call-by-name and call-by-value λC- and λC-tp reduction rules
where M has type ¬A. Felleisen and Hieb (1992) proposed the following
additional rules for λvC:
CE : E[C M ]→ C (λk. M (λx. A (k E[x])))
(where E stands for a call-by-value evaluation context) and
Celim : C (λk. k M)→M ,
where k is not free in M . The first rule, which is a generalization of
CL, CR, and Ctp, adds expressive power to the calculus. The second
rule, which is also used by Hofmann (1995), leads to better simulation
of evaluation. However, both rules destroy confluence of λvC as the
following example illustrates.
EXAMPLE 21. In the following diagram if M does not reduce to a
value then the two reduction sequences in the extended λvC cannot be
brought together.
C(λk.k M)→ C(λq.(λk.k M)(λx.A(q x)))→ C(λq.(λx.A(q x)) M)
↓
M
Felleisen et al. left unresolved the problem of finding an extended theory
that would include CE or Celim and still satisfy the classical properties
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of reduction theories. Since Celim is already present in our calculi and
CE is derivable, one may consider our calculi as a solution.
PROPOSITION 22.
1. λvC-tp and λnC-tp are confluent and strongly normalizing.
2. Subject reduction: Given λvC-tp (λnC-tp) terms M,N , if Γ ` M : A
and M→N then Γ ` N : A.
Proof. As shown in the next section, the λnC-tp calculus corresponds
to Parigot’s call-by-name λµ calculus, which is confluent and strongly
normalizable (Py, 1998; Parigot, 1993b; Parigot, 1997). The λvC-tp cal-
culus corresponds to a subset of the λµv calculus of Ong and Stewart
(1997) which is strongly normalizing. Confluence follows from the fact
that all critical pairs converge.
Soundness and completeness properties for λvC-tp with respect to
λvC are stated in terms of observational equivalence. Given a reduction
relation X, and two terms M and N , possibly containing free variables,
we say M 'X N if for every context P which binds all the free variables
of M and N , P [M ]→XV1 iff P [N ]→XV2 for some values V1 and V2.
For example, any two terms that are convertible using the reduction
relation are observationally equivalent. Two non-convertible terms may
still be equivalent if no sequence of reductions in any context can in-
validate their equivalence. An example of this kind is the equivalence
(λx.x) (y z) 'λC (y z). The embedding of λvC-tp into λvC essentially
removes occurrences of the top-level continuation, which is implicit
in λvC:
(C-(λk.J))• = C (λk.J•) (tp M)• = M•
PROPOSITION 23. Let M be a closed λvC term:
− If M→ λvCV then M◦ 'λvC-tp V ◦.
− If M◦→ λ
vC-tpV then M 'λvC V •.
The above proposition replaces Proposition 11 from the conference
version (Ariola and Herbelin, 2003) which claimed a stronger (but in-
correct) result. The proof of the first clause reduces to checking that
embedding both sides of every λvC-reduction produces semantically-
equivalent terms in λvC-tp. For some of the cases, embedded terms are
related by a corresponding reduction in λvC-tp and hence are obviously
semantically-equivalent. For the Cidem case, the embedded left-hand side
does not reduce to the embedded right-hand side, but both can reduce
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to a common term, and hence are again semantically-equivalent. The
left-hand side and right-hand side of the Ctp rule map into convertible
terms. The lifting rules CL are CR introduce a complication: proving
the equivalence of the embedded terms requires using the following
equivalence:
(λx.throw k x) M 'λC throw k M
even when M is not a value. This happens because in contrast to
the regular substitution operation, structural substitutions can replace
arbitrary jumps (k M) by (k (V M)) even when M is not a value.
The proof of the second clause reduces to proving:
1. For all λvC-terms M , we have M 'λvC M◦•
2. For every λvC-tp-reduction M → N , we have M• 'λC N•.
The proof of the first statement is almost straightforward: proving that
C M is equivalent to (C M)◦• requires using Ctp which is not a reduction
rule but otherwise a valid observational equivalence.
When attempting to prove the second statement, we encounter a
problem related to free continuation variables. Even though programs
are closed terms, reductions can happen anywhere including under
binders and hence it is possible for a λvC-tp-reduction to manipulate
an open term. In particular, consider C-idem where the continuation vari-
able k′ is free. The right-hand side maps to the λvC-term C(λk. J [k′/q]•)
but for the left-hand side we have:
C(λk. k′ C(λq. J•)) →
C(λk. C(λr. (λq. J•) (λx. A (r (k′ x))))) →
C(λk. C(λr. J•[λx. A (r (k′ x))/q])) →
C(λk.J•[λx. A ((λx.A x) (k′ x))/q])
which is equivalent to the λvC-term C(λk.J•[λx. A (k′ x)/q]). Since the
variable k′ is not special in λvC it could, as far as the λvC-theory is
concerned, be substituted with an arbitrary procedure and hence it is
definitely not the case that one can assume that k′ and (λx.A (k′ x))
are observationally equivalent. This assumption would be correct if we
could somehow guarantee that k′ is substituted by a continuation. In
a complete program, this is clearly the case as the left-hand side must
occur in a context . . . C-(λk′. . . .2 . . .) . . . which binds k′ to a contin-
uation variable. We just need to make this information explicit in the
statement of the Proposition (Sabry and Felleisen, 1993, Lemma 19):
2’. Let M → N be a λvC-tp-reduction, and let k1, . . . , kn be the free
continuation variables in M , then we have the equivalence
C (λk1 . . . C (λkn.M•)) 'λC C (λk1 . . . C (λkn.N•))
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The proof of the modified clause proceeds by cases. For the reduction
C-elim we use the fact that even though Celim is not a reduction of λvC, it
is a valid equivalence. The reductions C-L and C-R require the following
equivalences in λvC where k is a continuation variable and M may not
be a value:
(λx.k (V x)) M 'λC k (V M) (λx.k (x N)) M 'λC k (M N)
These again allow one to jump with a non-value. All the required λvC
equivalences are known to be valid (Kameyama and Hasegawa, 2003;
Sabry and Felleisen, 1993).
Remark 6. Reducing the term corresponding to C(λk. k I x) 1 we
have:
(C-(λk. tp ((λq.q I x)(λf. throw k f)))) 1 →
(C-(λk. tp (((λf. throw k f) I) x))) 1 →
(C-(λk. tp ((throw k I) x))) 1 →
(C-(λk. tp (throw k I))) 1 →
C-(λk. tp (throw k (I 1))) →
C-(λk. k (I 1)) →
C-(λk. k 1) →
1
This reduction sequence is better than the corresponding sequence
in λvC. However, the rules are still not complete with respect to eval-
uation. In particular, it is not possible to simulate the computation
rules:
C-(λk. k M) → M [tp/k]
C-(λ . tp M) → M
For example, the reduction rules cannot reduce the following program:
C-(λc. c (λx. throw c (λy. N)))
to λx.A-(λy. N). To do that the calculus must be extended with a
control delimiter (Ariola et al., 2004).
6. Computational Content of Classical Natural Deduction
with Multiple Conclusions
Figure 13 describes the λµ calculus of Parigot (1992) which is a term
assignment for classical natural deduction. The Passivate rule reads as
follows: given a term producing a value of type A, if α is a continuation
variable waiting for something of type A (i.e. A cont), then by invoking
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t, x ::= x | λx.t | t s | µα.c
c ::= [β]t | [tp]t
Γ ::= · | Γx
∆ ::= · | ∆α
Γ, Ax ` x : A; ∆
Ax Γ ` t : ⊥; ∆
[tp]t : Γ `; ∆ ⊥e
Γ, Ax ` t : B; ∆
Γ ` λx.t : A→ B; ∆
→i
Γ ` t : A→ B; ∆ Γ ` s : A; ∆
Γ ` t s : B; ∆
→e
Γ ` t : A;Aα,∆
[α]t : Γ `;Aα,∆ Passivate
c : Γ `;Aα,∆
Γ ` µα.c : A; ∆ Activate
Figure 13. λµtp and classical natural deduction with multiple conclusions
the continuation variable we leave the current context. Terms of the
form [α]t are called commands. The Activate rule reads as follows: given
a command (i.e. no formula is focused) we can select which result to
get by capturing the associated continuation. If Aα is not present in
the precondition then the rule corresponds to weakening. The rule ⊥e
differs from Parigot’s version as follows. In the original formulation, the
elimination rule for ⊥ is interpreted by a named term [γ]t, where γ is
any continuation variable (not always the same for every instance of the
rule). In contrast, the rule is here systematically associated to the same
primitive continuation variable, called tp, considered as a constant. This
was also observed by Streicher and Reus (1998). In Parigot’s style, DN
is represented with the term:
λy.µα.[γ](y (λx.µδ.[α]x))
whereas our representation is:
λy.µα.[tp](y (λx.µδ.[α]x)) .
We use λµtp to denote the whole calculus with ⊥e and λµ to denote
the calculus without ⊥e. The need for an extra continuation constant
to interpret the elimination of ⊥ can be emphasized by the following
statement.
PROPOSITION 24. A formula A is provable in minimal classical logic
(resp. classical logic) iff there exists a closed λµ term (resp. λµtp term) t
such that ` t : A is provable.
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v ::= x | λx.t
λµn and λµntp
Logical rule: (λx.t)s → t[s/x]
Structural rule: (µα.t)s → (µα.t[[α](ws)/[α]w])
Renaming rule: µα.[β]µγ.u → µα.u[β/γ]
Renaming rule’: µα.[tp]µγ.u → µα.u[tp/γ]
Simplification rule: µα.[α]u → u α 6∈ FV (u)
λµv and λµv tp
Logical rule: (λx.t)v → t[v/x]
Left structural rule: (µα.t)s → (µα.t[[α](ws)/[α]w])
Right structural rule: v(µα.t) → (µα.t[[α](vw)/[α]w])
Renaming rule: µα.[β]µγ.u → µα.u[β/γ]
Renaming rule’: µα.[tp]µγ.u → µα.u[tp/γ]
Simplification rule: µα.[α]u → u α 6∈ FV (u)
Figure 14. Call-by-name and call-by-value λµ and λµtp reduction rules
We write λµn and λµv (resp. λµntp and λµv tp) for the λµ calculus
(resp. λµtp calculus) equipped with call-by-name and call-by-value re-
duction rules, respectively. The reduction rules are given in Figure 14
(substitutions [[α](ws)/[α]w] and [[α](sw)/[α]w] are defined as in the
original formulation of the λµ calculus (Parigot, 1992)). The rules are
the same for the λµ and λµtp calculi. The calculus λµn is Parigot’s
original calculus, while our presentation of λµv is similar to the pre-
sentation of Ong and Stewart (1997). Both sets of reduction rules are
well-typed and satisfy subject reduction.
6.1. Relation between the λµtp and the λC-tp calculi
The λµtp calculi and the λC-tp calculi are in one-to-one correspondence:
λx.t = λx.t ts = ts C-(λα.γt) = µα.[γ]t
This correspondence extends to the reduction rules (Figure 12 matches
Figure 14), as expressed by the following statement.
LEMMA 25. Let t, s be λµtp-terms, then:
− t→λµntp s iff t→λnC-tp s
− t→λµv tp s iff t→λvC-tp s .
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The above proposition implies that Parigot’s λµ is a correct imple-
mentation of λC. Correctness of Parigot’s λµ with respect to a modified
reduction theory for C was already shown by de Groote (1994). How-
ever, the reduction rules did not contain the abort steps. A way to
account for these abort steps is presented in the paper’s conclusion.
The solution requires an extension of λµ. The relation between λµ and
a modified reduction theory for C was also studied by Ong and Stewart
(1997).
COROLLARY 26. Parigot’s λµ calculus is sound and complete with
respect to λC in the sense that the reductions of one calculus can be
simulated by the other.
7. Related Work
The relation between Parigot’s λµ and λC has been investigated by
de Groote (1994) who mainly considers the λµ structural rule but not
renaming and simplification. In the paper’s conclusion, renaming is
related to a rule proposed by Barbanera and Berardi (1993). As for λC,
he only considers CL and Ctp. However, these rules are not the original
rules of Felleisen, since they do not containA. For example, Ctp is CM →
C(λk.M(λf.k f)) which is in fact a reduction rule for λF (Felleisen,
1988). This work fails in relating λµ to λC in an untyped framework,
since it does not express continuations as abortive functions. It says
in fact that F behaves as C in the simply-typed case. A proposal for
modeling the abort steps is presented in the paper’s conclusion.
Ong and Stewart (1997) also do not consider the abort step in
Felleisen’s rules. This could be justified because in a simply-typed
setting these steps are of type ⊥ → ⊥. Therefore, it seems we have
a mismatch. While the aborts are essential in the reduction seman-
tics, they are irrelevant in the corresponding proof. We are the first
to provide a proof theoretic justification for those abort steps, they
correspond to the step ⊥ →⊥ .
Our presentation of classical natural deduction with one conclusion
is similar to de Groote’s presentation of λµ using intuitionistic sequents
(de Groote, 1998). Instead of distinguishing between ⊥ and ⊥ , de
Groote introduces a new kind of negation written as A⊥. As in our
case, there are two kinds of hypothesis: the regular hypothesis which
correspond to the λ-bound variables and the hypothesis of the form A⊥
which correspond to the continuation variables. The difference with our
system is that the invocation of a continuation variable does not force
one to perform a weakening step.
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In addition to Ong and Stewart, Py (1998), de Groote (1998) and
Bierman (1998) pointed out the peculiarity of having an open λµ term
corresponding to a tautology. Their solution is to abolish the distinction
between commands and terms. A command is a term returning ⊥. The
body of a µ-abstraction is not restricted to a command, but can be of
the form µα.t, where t is of type ⊥. Thus, we have λy.µα.(y λx.[α]x) :
¬¬A → A. We would then represent the term C(λk.(kI)x) (where I
is λx.x) as µα.([α]I)x. Whereas C(λk.kIx) would reduce to C(λk.kI)
according to λnC and to I in λµntp, it would be in normal form in their
calculus. Thus, their work in relating λµ to λC only applies to typed
λC, whereas our work also applies to the untyped case.
Crolard (1999) studied the relation between Parigot’s λµ and a cal-
culus with a catch and throw mechanism. He showed that contraction
corresponds to the catch operator (µα.[α]t = catch α t) and weaken-
ing corresponds to the throw operator (µδ.[α]t = throw α t for δ not
free in t). He only considers terms of the form µα.[α]t and µβ.[α]t,
where β does not occur free in t. This property is not preserved by the
renaming rule, therefore reduction is restricted. We do not require such
restrictions on reduction. We can simulate Ong and Stewart’s λµ and
Crolard’s calculus via this simple translation: µα.t becomes µα.[tp]t
and [β]t becomes µδ.[β]t, where δ is not free in t.
A categorical semantics of the call-by-name and call-by-value ver-
sions of Parigot’s λµ-calculus extended with disjunction have been
provided by Selinger (2001).
8. Conclusions
Mi
n
Int
uit
Mi
n C
las
s
Cla
ss
λ λµ
λC-
λA-
λ
λtp
`M `MC
RAA⊥ ,⊥i`M`M
⊥e,RAA⊥ ,⊥i`M
`Iλµtp `C
EFQ⊥⊥ `MλC-tp
Our analysis of the logical strengths of EFQ, PL (or EM), and DN
has led naturally to a restricted form of classical logic called minimal
classical logic. Depending on whether EFQ, PL, or both are assumed
in minimal logic, we get intuitionistic, minimal classical, or classical
logic. Depending on whether we admit RAA⊥ and ⊥e in full classical
natural deduction (on top of minimal natural deduction), we get the
correspondences with the λ-calculi considered in this paper, as summa-
rized above. The calculus λtp is the subset of λµtp in which expressions
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of the form µδ.[α]t are only allowed when δ is not free in t and α is tp.
The symbol EFQ⊥⊥ stands for ⊥e and Weakening. Among these systems,
λC-tp is a confluent extension of Felleisen’s theory of control.
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